State of Utah v. Budd Jay Read : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1952
State of Utah v. Budd Jay Read : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clinton D. Vernon; Quention L. R. Alston; Richard J. Maughan; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Read, No. 7792 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1681
. . --------------------------------------
. 1 1 - -- - - -- - -
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 883 
BUDD JAY READ, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
F '\;;· · ~ "7 -- . '. :-,~·-;:;·\ 1 -~ ... ~ t~J jt)gLINTON D. VERNON, 
\':. -.:\ ·-_.: .. : ·. ~2 Attorney General 
- --- --·- ---- -- - ----- ---·- - -··---- - - --- --~----- ·QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
C ... : ~·:~ .... , ~:~; ) -; ·· t- rr!e Lu-::~~ .. -~~:,-::."~RICHARD J. MAUGHAN, 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------:--------------------- 3 
STATEMENT 0 F POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 4 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Point I. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain the Convic-
tion _______________________________________ ------__ ------______________ . __ __ ____ 4 
Point II. The Court Properly Instructed the Jury ______________ 10 
Point III. The Court Properly Refused to Grant a New 
Trial ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
26 American Jurisprudence, Homicide Sees. 507, 508 ________ 10 
53 American Juris prudence, Trial, Sec. 5 29 -------------------------- 11 
53 American Jurisprudence, Trial, Sec. 5~·9, 541 ------~----------- 13 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 
Permanent Ed. Sec. 6320 ---------------------------------------------- 12 
CASES CITED 
Alabama Power Co. v. Jackson, 232 Ala. 42, 166 So. 692.. 12 
Alaga Coach Line v. McCarrol, 227 Ala. 686, 151 So. 834, 
92 A.L.R. 470 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX Continued 
Page 
Albert v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 894, 27 S.E. 2d 177 -------- 8 
Cain v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. R. ____ , 178 SW 2d 267 ---------------- 10 
·Flowers v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. ____ , 177 SW 2d 67 ------------------ 10 
Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 SW 803, 59 A.L.R. 685.. 9 
Pack v. State, 54 Ok. Cr. 234; 18 P 2d 284 ---------------------------- 10 
People v. Kelley, 70 Cal. App. 519, 234 P 110 ------------------ 8 
Silsby v. Hinchey, 107 SW 2d 812 · ---------------------------------------- 12 
State v. Johnson, ____ Mo. ____ , 55 SW 2d 967 ---------------------- 10 
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 6 3, 15 7 P 2d 2 58 ------------------- 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 883 
BUDD JAY READ, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Budd Jay Read, the defendant and appellant herein, was 
convicted of the crime of involuntary manslaughter arising 
out of an automobile-bicycle collision in Logan, Cache County, 
Utah, on September 6, 1951, and appeals. 
Appellant's brief summarizes fairly accurately the evt-
dence which was presented to the Court and jury upon which 
the conviction was based. Respondent will therefore refrain 
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from making an independent presentation of the facts at this 
time but will do so where necessary in view of the fact that 
appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the con-
viction. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE CONVICTION. 
2. THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY. 
3. THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
CONVICTION. 
Points 1, 6 and 8 relied upon by appellant for a reversal 
all relate to the proposition that there was r{ot sufficient evi-
_dence to submit the case to the jury or to sustain the. conviction. 
It is respectfully submitted that an analysis of the record will 
show that there was ample evidence of the criminal negligence 
of the defendant which directly caused or contributed to the 
death of the deceased. 
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The evidence reveals that the accident occurred at ap· 
proximately 5:00 P.M. on September 6, 1951, as defendant 
\vas proceeding north on the east side of Main Street between· 
5th and 6th North Streets in Logan, Utah. Defendant's own 
testimony establishes that just prior to the impact he was not 
keeping a proper look-out but "that his entire attention was 
directed to a car coming out of Safeway's parking lot on 
the east side of the street (Tr. 191). He freely admitted 
he paid no attention to traffic conditions on the street (Tr. 
203·4) . There is no evidence in the record to show. that the 
view of defendant was in any way impaired (Tr. 204). All 
of the evidence indicates that a reasonably prudent person 
under the same or similar circumstances would have observed 
the deceased and would have avoided hitting him. In addi-
tion to the fact that defendanfs attention was directed away 
from the direction in which he was proceeding, there is sub-
stantial evidence to show that defendant was intoxicated and 
that his ability to keep his 'Car under proper control was im-
paired (Tr. 79, 99, 125, 194). It is undisputed that the 
posted speed limit at the time and place in question was 25 
n1iles an hour, and it is respectfully submitted that the evi-
dence shows defendant drove his car in excess of the posted. 
speed litnit, and with marked disregard for the safety of others 
(Tr. 59, 149). 
Eye witness testimony establishes that the death of the 
deceased was almost instantaneous and a direct and proximate 
result of the impact. The direct examination of Mrs. Bjorkman 
(Tr. 46) includes the following: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Then what happened then? What did you observe 
with respect to the impact itself? 
A. Well, when the car hit the bicycle the man flew 
up in the air, and as he came down the car hit him 
once more, and then the body kept rolling over 
and landed in front of my car. 
Q. How far west did the body stop with respect to your 
car? 
A. Just a little in front of my car. 
Mrs. Bjorkman observed also that ((blood was pouring out 
of his head" and that ((there was a big pool of blood" (Tr. 47). 
The testimony shows further that as a result of the ((terrific 
impact" (Tr. 45) the body was violently hurled a dist ance of 
61 feet (Tr. 30). 
· The contradicted tesimony reveals that the doctor was 
· present at the scene within two minutes after the impact. Upon 
making appropriate observations he stated that there was no 
need to examine the body because the man was already dead 
(Tr. 77, 85). No other conclusion but that the terrific impact 
and the projection of deceased's body against the hard surface 
of the highway caused his death would be tenable. The jury, 
with whom rested the sole responsibility for resolving the evi-
dence which was presented for their consideration properly 
came to that conclusion under appropriate instructions from 
the court that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the criminal negligence of the defendant was ((the proximate 
cause of the accident and resulting death." 
From the foregoing facts, the argument that there should 
have been a directed verdict of not guilty, that appellant's 
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motion for arrest of judgment should have been sustained, 
or that defendant's request not to submit the cause to the jury 
at all should have been sustained, is contrary to the ruling of 
this Court in the case of State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 
P. 2d 258. That case dealt with a charge of involuntary man-
slaughter arising out of an automobile accident. This Court, 
in holding that under the circumstances the trial court erred 
in granting defendant's motion of dismissal, said: 
It is a well established legal principle that a motion 
of dismissal and for direction of verdict for defendant 
is, in effect, a demurrer to the evidence. It admits the 
truth of the evidence as disclosed by the record and 
every reasonable inference that might be drawn there-
from. When different reasonable inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence, the question is one exclu-
sively within the province of the jury. It is not the func-
tion of the court to substitute its judgment on questions_ 
of fact for that of the jury. Therefore, in considering 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
record must be viewed in the light almost favorable 
to the state. Stat v. Rosser, 162 Or. 293, 86 P 2d 441,. 
87 p 2d 783, 91 p 2d 295. 
* * * * * 
Although the evidence may not have been sufficient 
to have proven that defendant was traveling as fast 
as 60 miles· -per hour as testified to by the patrolmen, · 
nevertheless, after a careful examination of the record, 
we conclude, that the jury could have found from. 
their testimony that defendant was exceeding the speed 
limit and that said speeding was a proximate cause 
of the accident. 
* * * * * 
We conclude that defendant's failure to keep his 
eyes and attention on the road in front of him while 
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driving at a high rate of speed· at nighttime. was suffi-
cient evidence to have justified the jury in finding that 
his driving was in marked disregard for the safety 
of the deceased or criminal negligence. The trial court 
. erred in granting defendant's motion of dismissal. 
In the same case, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice 
Wolfe remarked: 
The fact that defendant hit the pedestrians, if not 
explained, would itself justify an inference that he 
was not keeping a proper lookout. 
In Albert v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 894, 27 SE 2d 177, 
another case involving an appeal from a conviction of involun-
tary manslaughter as a result of an automobile accident, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia said: 
It may in passing, however, be said if Albert was 
drunk and if his .drunkenness brought about_ Mrs. 
Johnson's death, he is still liable even though he was 
as careful as a drunk man could be expected to be. 
The California Court in People v. Kelley, 70 Cal. App. 
519, 234 P 1 ~0, had this to say about the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict of the jury in finding the 
defendant guilty of manslaughter in an automobile accident 
case. 
As to the verdict against the defendant finding him 
guilty of manslaughter, appellant contends that the 
evidence· is insufficient to support such a verdict. In 
supportof this contention appellant claims that there 
was no proof introduced by the prosecution, asid~ from 
his own extra judicial admissions, as to the rate of 
speed appellant was traveling at the time of and just 
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prior to the collision. Conceding for the present that 
the only evidence as to the speed appellant was travel-
ing was that furnished by his own extrajudicial ad-
missions, yet there was evidence tending to prove that 
appellant, at and just prior to the collision, was driving 
his car while under the influence of liquor, and that, 
while so driving his car, he collided with Mrs. Sarah 
Joy, and from such collision she sustained injuries 
which caused her death. This evidence was sufficient 
to support the verdict of manslaughter independent 
of any evidence as to the speed at which appellant was 
driving has car at the time he struck the deceased. 
In Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, 59 A.L.R. 
685, it appeared that a person was undertaking to cross a street 
in the middle of a block when he was run over and killed by 
the accused, who was under the influence of an intoxicant 
at the time. The court, in affirming a conviction of involuntary" 
manslaughter said: 
* * * We think the policy of the law forbids an 
investigation as to probable ·consequence, when the 
. driver of an automobile cunder the influence of an in-
toxicant,' as heretofore defined, runs his car E:?Ver an-
other person and kills him on the public highways of 
the state. There are many things that a sober man, in 
the exercise of due care, would do to avoid such a col-
liison, which would be entirely beyond an intoxicated 
driver. Fa tali ties are too numerous and conditions too 
serious to permit speculative inquiries in a case like 
the one before us. 
According to the well settled rules of law it is peculiarly 
within the province of the jury to deter~ine from all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the transaction whether there 
was such a failure of duty or negligence as to render one 
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criminally responsible for the death of another. 26 Am. Jur., 
Homicide, Sees. 507, 508. Where there is such evidence ap-
pellate courts are loathe to overturn the verdict of the injury. 
See State v. Johnson, ____ Mo. ____ , 55 SW 2d 967; Pack v. State, 
54 Ok. Cr. 234, 18 P 2d 284; Cain v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. R ----, 
178 SW 2d 267; Flowers v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. ____ 177, SW 2d 67. 
Point II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
By requested instruction No. Four the defendant wanted 
the court to point out to the jury that even if they should be-
lieve that the de~endant was operating _his car while under 
the influence of liquor, their verdict should be not guilty if 
he was then exercising due and proper caution and was there-
fore not guilty of grossly negligent, wanton or reckless acts 
proximately causing injury to the deceased and his death. That 
is exactly what the court did when in Instruction No. Eight it 
defined the phrase ((under the influence of intoxicating liquor'' 
and in instruction No. Six it pointed out specifically that ((if, 
however, you believe that the defendant was then exercising 
due and proper care and caution, and was not guilty of criminal 
negligence proximately causing injury to the deceased and 
his death, your verdict should be not guilty.', 
Instruction No. Nine given by the court embodies all 
the assumptions set forth in defendant's requestion Instruction 
No. Ten on which assumptions defendant claims he had a 
right to rely. we submit that the instruction as given is in 
10 
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language even n1ore favorable to the defendant than his re-
quested instruction. Likewise defendant's requested Instruc-
tion No. One and one-half we submit was given to the jury 
in the court's instructions Nos. Two and Three. 
It is a well recognized rule that instructions need not 
be given in the precise 'vords in which counsel frames them. 
ttl£ the court instructs the jury correctly and in substance 
covers the relevant rules of law proposed to him by counsel, 
there is no error in refusing to adopt the exact words of re-
quests." 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 529. 
The argument of appellant in Point No. 5 is not well 
taken. Instruction No. Ten given by the court merely 
states a fundamental principal of law that if defendant were 
not negligent he should be acquitted. When read in the light 
of the other instructions requiring the jury to find that the 
criminal negligence of the defendant, if any, must_ be the proxi- · 
mate cause of the accident and resulting death, it could not have 
prejudiced the defendant in any way. 
In Points 9 and 10 appellant argues that the Court erred 
in_ admitting in evidence Exhibit tl A," showing skid marks,_ 
or any testimony at ·au concerning skid marks, because it is 
claimed that there was no evidence that the skid marks were 
made by defendant's car. Further, appellant objects to Mr. 
Hadfield's computations of speed from the skid marks re-
ferred to because of appellant's claim that he purportedly was 
not qualified to do so. 
The authorities all support the proposition that witnesses 
present at the scene of an accident at the time or shortly after 
11· 
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its occurrence may testify that marks leading to where an 
automobile was located· were or could have been made by such 
automobile. See Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
and Practice, Permanent Edition, Sec. 6320; Alabama Power 
Co. v. Jackson, 232 Ala. 42, 166 So. 692; Silsby v. Hinchey, 
107 SW 2d 812; and, Alaga Co~ch Line v. McCarrol, 227 Ala., 
686, 151 So. 834, 92 A.L.R. 470. In this case there were sev-
eral witnesses "rho saw the skid marks and testified that they 
\vere. or could have been made by defendant's car. 
Mr. Tolman's testimony is . explicit that they . did come 
from defendant's car. He testified in part as follows (Tr. 16, 
17): 
Q. Is there any indication at all that those skid marks 
which you speak about, was there anything on the 
pavement there that tends to show that they came 
from this young man's car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What are they? 
A. From the skid marks straight to where the bicycle 
was you could see dictinctly two tire marks the 
distance-
Q. Just a minute. 
THE COURT: Let him answer now. You asked 
him. 
MR. NELSON: He's your witness now. Let him go 
ahead. 
Q. Will you state it again now? 
A. You could see skid marks the distance between. 
an automobile's tires, so that you could pretty well 
tell it was the same car, because they went in the 
12 
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same line the same distance apart straight to where 
the bicycle was, and that's where they ended, and 
that's \vhere some more glass was found. 
See also the testimony of Mrs. Bjorkman (Tr. 48, 49, 61, 62, 
65), Mr. Merrill (Tr. 71) and.Mr. Everton (Tr. 85, 86). 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of Mr. 
Hadfield was not prejudicial to the defendant. His compu-
tations were made by applying a formula he learned at the 
Traffic School at Northwestern University, Evansville, Illinois, 
to hypothetical situations which were presented to him. He 
did not ascribe any particular speed to defendant's car but 
merely stated what speed was indicated from hypothetical facts 
submitted to him. It rested exclusively with the jury in con-
sidering all the other evidence as to the speed of defendant's 
car to determine what weight and credibility, if any, should 
be accorded Mr. Hadfield's testimony. 
The alleged errors set forth by appellant in Point -No. 11 
we submit have been adequately answered in our argument 
under Point No. I. As to the questionnaire form of instruc-
tion number two, it is well established that the language, form 
and style of instructions in which the court expounds the law 
are matters within the sound discretion of the court. 53 Am. 
Jur., Trial, Sec. 5 39, 541. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The alleged errors set forth in Point No. 12 raise no issues 
13 
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which have not already been covered and it is respectfully sub-
mitted that there is substantial evidence in the record to 
establish beyond a reasonabel doubt that the defendant was 
guilty of criminal negligence which directly caused or con-
tributed to the death of the deceased. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of the 
transcript and proceedings· in this case discloses ample and 
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of defendant of 
the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The crime was estab-
lished by proper and uncontroverted testimony. It is submitted 
the instructions given by the Court fairly and completely cover-
ed the law pertinent to the issues raised in this case; indeed 
said instructions weer favorable to the defendant. The con-
viction should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN, 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attot"neys for Respondent 
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